It took just under 2 years from the end of the Iran-Iraq War for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s relations with his two biggest allies, Kuwait and the United States, to be irrevocably destroyed. Yesterday, of course, was the 25th anniversary of Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait and officially kick off the Gulf War, aka “The War Against Iraq That Maybe Actually Wasn’t So Bad, If You Think About It, If You Just Look At It In Isolation.” I would have written about it yesterday, but even unpaid bloggers need a day off here and there.
Saddam’s reasons for invading Kuwait were
varied and complex money, it was pretty much all about money. And oil, which is really just another word for “money.” Kuwait had it (money, I mean, and oil too but again that’s the same thing) and Saddam didn’t. He didn’t even have the money to repay the loans Kuwait had floated him during the (Iran-Iraq) war. The Kuwaitis, see, had spent a good portion of the war serving as Iraq’s main port, since Iraq’s actual main port city, Basra, was mostly shut down due to the fighting. The Kuwaitis also lent Iraq a lot of money to keep fighting. Initially Kuwait didn’t want to get involved in the war, but then its ruling Sabah family started to worry that its own subjects (especially its substantial Shiʿa minority) were checking out that whole Islamic Revolution thing and getting some Doubleplus Ungood Ideas. So they decided to throw in with Saddam. His Baʿathist ideology, to the extent that Saddam actually gave a shit about any ideology, was just as opposed to the idea of monarchy as Iran’s revolutionary ideology was. But there was no reason to believe that Saddam had any interest in exporting his ideology, the way Iran’s new leaders did, and so Kuwait’s rulers decided he wasn’t a threat to them. Oops.
Anyway, long story short, the Iran-Iraq war ended. While neither side really “won” the war, Iraq had been the aggressor and so was worse off for the war having changed nothing. Iraq had also gone into heavy international debt to finance the war, and its failure to annex any of Iran’s oil-rich territory or gain control over the Shatt al-Arab meant that it wasn’t going to have a way to pay its creditors back anytime soon. Kuwait, of course, was one of those creditors. Now, you might think that, what with all their massive oil wealth and the fact that they were really paying Saddam to fight the war kind of on their behalf, the Kuwaitis could afford to forgive some or all of Iraq’s debt. That’s certainly what Saddam thought. But the Kuwaitis saw things differently–they wanted to be repaid, thank you very much. The two countries were also on opposite sides of a debate over oil prices within OPEC–Iraq wanted the cartel to cut production in order to drive prices up, but Kuwait, which didn’t mind low oil prices at the time, pushed to be allowed to increase its own production and then pretty much ignored its caps anyway. According to financial experts, this cost Iraq a “metric buttload” of money.
Then things really turned ugly. Iraq started accusing Kuwait of slant-drilling into Iraq’s side of their shared Rumelia Oil Field. They had no evidence for this charge apart from the fact that Kuwait was producing more oil from the field than Iraq was, which was easily explainable since Iraq had just come out of a grueling 9 year war and Kuwait, you know, hadn’t. Iraq probably did lose oil in the field to Kuwait, but that’s because oil, and bear with me because this gets technical in a geological sense, is a “liquid,” which can “flow” from place to place, so when one side of an oil field is being exploited, the oil on the other side will flow in that direction. Science!
The Iraqis tried to justify invading Kuwait both on the economic justice issue and because, according to them, Kuwait had always been a “province” of Iraq. Considering there had never been an “Iraq” (at least not in the nation-state sense) prior to the end of World War I, this was a bit of a weird claim to make. Kuwait had been nominally part of the Ottoman Empire since it (meaning the city, what we now call “Kuwait City”) was founded in the 17th century, and it had been part of a province that was administered from Basra, so that’s something I guess. But Kuwait had been mostly autonomous for its entire existence, and cut its own deal with the British in 1899 that formalized its autonomy from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. It became a British protectorate in 1913 under an Anglo-Ottoman treaty and stayed that way until achieving independence in 1961, well after “Iraq” had come into being. So no, it was never part of “Iraq,” the nation-state, and historically it had been de facto, if not technically, separate from what became Iraq for at least a couple of centuries.
But I’m sure many or all of you know what happened next. The Iraqis took their complaints about Kuwait to the US, whose ambassador, April Glaspie, told Saddam that “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait,” but also expressed US “concern” over his military buildup in southern Iraq. Guess which part of her remarks Saddam heard. On August 2, 1990, his military launched a nighttime invasion of Kuwait, whose forces were completely caught off guard and wouldn’t have stood much of a chance even if the Iraqis had RSVPed beforehand. The much larger and more powerful Iraqi army swarmed into the country and had it under their control within the first day. Kuwait’s emir, Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, hightailed it over the border and into Saudi Arabia, but most of his subjects weren’t so lucky and wound up stuck in Iraq-occupied Kuwait. An estimated 4200 Kuwaitis were killed in the initial invasion, and more died in the weeks that followed, as many of them formed resistance units and engaged in a guerrilla campaign against their Iraqi occupiers. The American, and international, outcry against Iraq’s move was swift and unusually universal, but that’s a story for another time.
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