Anybody familiar with the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre might wonder if the title of this post refers to the Palestinian terrorist organization that perpetrated the Munich attack, and the answer is
See, “Black September,” the organization, never would have existed if it weren’t for “Black September,” the event that began on September 16, 1970 in Jordan. Or at the very least, the organization would have been called something else.
Prior to September 1970, tensions had been on rise for many years between the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan and the country’s majority Palestinian population. Jordan had become home to large numbers of Palestinians in the wake of the formation of Israel–and subsequent Arab-Israeli War–in 1948, which resulted in a lot of Palestinian refugees and in Jordan annexing the West Bank. When Israel seized the West Bank after the 1967 Six-Day War, still more Palestinian refugees made their way from the West Bank into Jordan proper.
Jordan’s King Hussein
elected to welcome these Palestinian refugees into his kingdom with open arms and do all he could to incorporate them into Jordanian society haha, sorry, I drifted off into an alternate reality there for a few seconds. King Hussein treated those refugees the way pretty much everybody treats refugees, as sub-human parasites who are simultaneously a do-nothing drag on the nation and an acute threat to national security. Which is great, because treating refugees that way always pays off in the end.
That’s not to say that Hussein’s problems with the Palestinians were entirely imagined or invented. This was a somewhat unique refugee situation in that Palestinians actually outnumbered Jordanians in Jordan. This made many Jordanians uncomfortable, even though in the 1950s the whole notion of “Palestinians” as a national identity distinct from “Jordanians” was still a pretty new idea and so those tensions probably could have been managed better. But worse, Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization had a habit of launching attacks against Israel from refugee camps inside Jordanian territory, which led to Israeli reprisals against those camps and, therefore, against Jordan.
Hussein ordered the PLO to ix-nay the cross-border attacks, but they essentially ignored him. Which they could afford to do in part because, to reiterate, there were more Palestinians than Jordanians in Jordan, so if anything the PLO had a larger political base than the king. Hussein’s security forces secretly worked with the Israelis to try to clamp down on border security, though for obviously reasons this wasn’t something Hussein wanted the public to know. Then came the Battle of Karamah in 1968, when the Israeli army crossed into Jordan and destroyed the Karamah refugee camp in response to a series of PLO attacks inside Israel. After Karamah, to try to ease tensions between the Palestinians and the Jordanian government, the PLO and Hussein reached an accord: essentially, the PLO pledged to stop acting like a wholly autonomous nation that was simply squatting on Jordanian territory. Among other things, the PLO was barred from printing its own ID papers, from clothing members in military uniforms, from acting as police/army in Palestinian areas, and from collecting taxes.
The PLO promptly ignored most of the things it had agreed to, and so the situation grew more tense. In February 1970, Hussein issued a number of royal edicts that attempted to restrict Palestinian behavior, which led to the outbreak of Palestinian protests against the monarchy and led the PLO to actually increase its quasi-governmental activities. Then, in September, the PLO’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) faction (what, you thought Monty Python’s Life of Brian was joking?)
carried out four hijackings in quick succession to get the rest of the world’s attention, while decreeing that northwestern Jordan was henceforth “liberated.”
This, as you might imagine, didn’t go over too well with King Hussein. He declared martial law and sent the military to attack PLO offices in Amman as well as Palestinian camps in northwestern Jordan. The Jordanian army pushed PLO paramilitaries into the mountains and killed at least a couple thousand of them, but this military success was counterbalanced by a larger diplomatic failure. Hussein, see, was handicapped by the fact that most of the Arab world was more sympathetic to the Palestinians than they were to him. There were concerns about an Iraqi intervention, and Syria actually invaded Jordan, which prompted Hussein to appeal to the US for help (this raised tensions between the US and the USSR, which as today was in Syria’s corner), before a counterattack by the Jordanian Air Force was able to drive the Syrians back over the border. Still, on September 27, in Cairo, Hussein agreed to a ceasefire written by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser that recognized the PLO’s rights to operate in Jordan. Nasser suffered a massive heart attack and died the following day.
That was the end of Black September (the month), but not of the Jordanian-PLO conflict. Arafat agreed to abide by Hussein’s rules governing the PLO’s activities, but a couple of groups under the PLO umbrella, including the PFLP, simply refused to be bound by Arafat’s arrangement. So the fighting picked up again in November and continued until summer 1971. Despite initially having sought an accord with Hussein, when the fighting resumed Arafat and his Fatah faction joined right in. Arafat began openly calling for Hussein to be deposed, saying that the Jordanian king was about to sign a peace treaty with Israel and that removing him was the only way to stop it. And he was right! King Hussein did sign a peace treaty with Israel!
In, ah, 1994.
Anyway, without some outside intervention by a stronger Arab nation, the PLO was completely out of its depth trying to take on the Jordanian army. No intervention was forthcoming, and Nasser, the one guy in the Arab world who could have probably backed Hussein off through sheer force of will, was dead. So the Jordanian army gradually mopped up Palestinian resistance, and by July the last PLO elements (including Arafat) had been expelled from Jordan and were setting up shop in their new home, Lebanon (courtesy of new Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s generous decision to allow them free passage across Syria). King Hussein’s reputation in the Arab world took a major hit over the whole affair, but in the end he had reasserted full control over his kingdom, so that was probably a price he was willing to pay.
Speaking of Assad, he became president of Syria in part because of Black September; at the time, Assad (who was Minister of Defense and the de facto de facto leader of the country) was engaged in a power struggle with the head of Syria’s Baʿath Party, Salah Jadid, who as party leader was supposed to be the de facto leader of the country. Jadid had supported Syria’s invasion of Jordan, and, when it failed (in part because Assad made sure it would, by refusing to involve the Syrian Air Force), the political fallout led Jadid to remove Assad from power. Well, to try to remove Assad from power. Assad responded by launching a coup, in November 1970, that ousted and imprisoned Jadid and toppled the government he’d put in place in favor of one led by Assad.
Black September, the organization, was established in 1971 as a wing/splinter of Fatah that could be tasked with conducting reprisal attacks in Jordan and terrorist attacks on an international scale (by which I mean in places outside of Israel-Palestine) while still giving Fatah and the PLO some deniability. It was disbanded in 1974 when the PLO decided to put the kibosh on international terrorism (but not on attacks inside Israel, of course).
In a peculiarly random bit of fallout, the events of Black September actually played a major role in Pakistani history. How, you ask? Well, when Black September kicked off, there was a Pakistani military unit in Jordan conducting training exercises with the Jordanian military. It was led by a brigadier named Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Operating on his own authority, Zia took command of a division of the Jordanian army and played a significant role in those early military successes against the PLO. Zia was almost court martialed for his actions when he got home, but he was saved by the intervention of the commander in chief of the Pakistani army, Gul Hassan Khan.
In fact, Zia’s battlefield successes in Jordan were part of the reason why Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promoted him to four-star general and Army Chief of Staff in 1976, a decision that Bhutto would regret when, oops, Zia led the 1977 coup that ousted Bhutto (and eventually led to his 1979 execution). Zia ruled Pakistan more or less dictatorially until his death in 1988. Apropos of nothing, Zia’s government was the key pipeline for U.S. military aid going to the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s, which was an excellent aid program that had no negative long-term implications for the U.S. or the region whatsoever, the end.
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