Today is the anniversary of the initial airstrikes of Operation Desert Storm, the “oh, it’s just one play on the slots–what could go wrong?” of America’s full-blown addiction to blowing things up in the Middle East. Thanks to YouTube, you kids out there can relive it as it happened…or, at least, “as it happened” to Americans watching from their nice, quiet living rooms:
Although he was America’s good close pal when he was heroically gassing tens of thousands of Iranians throughout much of the 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was unjustifiable, the human rights abuses that followed were real (well, some of them were real–many, like the infamous “Iraqi soldiers pulled Kuwaiti babies out of incubators and left them to die” horror story, were invented by PR firms hired by Kuwaiti royals), and the threat he posed to Saudi Arabia was legitimate cause for concern. I don’t like the fact that we’re all so dependent on oil any more than you do, but that’s something we should have started changing 18 years before the Gulf War. We did not. And given that we were–are–so dependent on oil, it’s understandable most of the world found it intolerable that such an obviously malign actor should be one more military offensive away from controlling a third or so of the world’s proven reserves.
Consequently, there was wide global consensus that Saddam’s early August 1990 invasion needed to be rolled back. The United Nations Security Council, in the midst of its brief post-Cold War era of good feelings, voted in rapid succession in the following days to demand Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, impose economic sanctions on Iraq, and impose a naval blockade to enforce it. Saddam Hussein played around a little, offering to discuss a withdrawal from Kuwait in the context of a region-wide withdrawal from all occupied territories. Yes, he was talking about Israel, but also Syria in Lebanon and some lingering territorial issues from the Iran-Iraq War. Later he would propose leaving Kuwait only after all foreign forces had left the Middle East. The US and UK (especially the latter–Margaret Thatcher really leaned on George Bush I to take a hard line against the invasion) weren’t having it.
The immediate concern after Iraqi forces rolled into Kuwait was that they would keep rolling into Saudi Arabia. Saddam publicly lashed out at the Saud family, accusing it of relying on US support to remain in power and employing–for a mostly secular dictator–a good deal of hardline religious rhetoric to declare the Saudis illegitimate. In doing this he was turning on a country that had backed him to the hilt during the Iran-Iraq War, mostly because he didn’t want to repay the billions of dollars worth of loans they’d floated him. He figured, not entirely unreasonably, that he was helping the Saudis by warring with Iran, and that money should have taken the form of payment for services rendered rather than loans. So at the Saudis’ invitation, the US deployed a “defensive” force in the kingdom to deter further Iraqi expansion–this was Operation Desert Shield.
Of course we know now that this “defensive” force was the nucleus of the army that would eventually push the Iraqis out of Kuwait, but even at the time it was pretty clear the US wasn’t sending thousands of soldiers, dozens of aircraft, and two Naval carrier groups to the Persian Gulf just to park them there in case Saddam got any funny ideas. But there they parked for several weeks, while the Bush administration pursued a flurry of pre-war diplomacy. One outcome of that effort was the November 29 Security Council resolution that authorized force to roll back the Iraqi invasion and gave Saddam until January 15, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait. Another was the construction of a nearly 1 million man force from some 34 countries, with several other countries (Japan, Germany, and Kuwait, among others) contributing billions of dollars toward the war effort. The Saudis, by the way, contributed both militarily and financially.
The UN’s January 15 deadline passed with the Iraqis still squatting in Kuwait, and so the war began the following evening, Washington time, which means the early morning of January 17 in Iraq. The war began with coalition airstrikes and that’s what it mostly remained, apart from the brief Iraqi occupation of the Saudi town of Khafji in late January, until the final, rapid ground assault that drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait in late February.
It’s easy, in retrospect, to understand why the Gulf War is looked at as a great victory. Obviously it was a thorough military success. It was fought with a huge, unprecedented really, level of international unanimity that it was the right thing to do. It focused on a well-defined, measurable military objective and it held to that objective even when the ease with which it was achieved might have encouraged the coalition to push further. All I’m saying is that if you’re making a list of the most damaging, most self-defeating military interventions the United States has ever undertaken, there are a whole bunch of them that would rank higher than the Gulf War. If, that is, you ignore the fact that it kicked off nearly three decades now of American fun and games in the Middle East.
Of course, that’s not really the kind of thing you can ignore. Admittedly, America’s current struggles with respect to the greater Middle East have roots that go back earlier than the Gulf War–arming the Afghan Mujahideen turned out to be a pretty bad idea, for example, and the less said about America’s repeated interference in Iran the better–but consider that the United States hasn’t left the nation of Iraq alone for so much as a solid month since 1991. We started off low-key–just an embargo and some sanctions that killed a few hundred thousand people, maybe the occasional airstrike or ten–but after 9/11 we came back with a real vengeance (literally). The Gulf War put Saddam in America’s crosshairs, it established America as the protector of the Gulf states, and it put American troops in Saudi Arabia to the consternation of at least one budding international terrorist. It made CNN famous (that’s bad, in hindsight), made Dick Cheney popular (very bad), and brought us the fiction that is “smart bombs,” so we could pretend that American weapons don’t kill innocent bystanders anymore (doubleplus bad).
The Gulf War also brought us Gulf War Syndrome, contaminated parts of Kuwait and Iraq with used depleted uranium ammunition, and, courtesy of the the retreating Iraqis, left oil wells all over Kuwait burning and leaking. The full health and environmental impacts of these things is still not fully known. The war also led Iraqi Kurds and Shiʿa Arabs to rebel against Saddam, only to be brutally suppressed when the US, which heavily encouraged their rebellions, decided not to help them out. And it gave us the WMD issue, even as it actually marked the beginning of the end of Saddam’s WMD programs.
The Gulf War was a dramatic military victory that helped cement the feeling in the US that we’d Won the Cold War and were now the World’s Only Superpower®. And in hindsight, compared with anything else the US has done in the region since then, the victory looks like a phenomenal achievement. But the contours of US involvement in the Middle East over the past 25 years are rooted in–or can at least developed via–this war. And from the perspective of so many of the Iraqi people, the Gulf War was the start of almost 30 years (and still counting!) of largely unremitting misery, thanks in large part to the United States.