For a while the Soviet-Afghan War was seen as the Beginning of the End of the Soviet Union, and while that may still be a fair description, I suspect we’d think of it a bit differently nowadays. The plucky Mujahideen who earned America’s support and admiration for their brave fight against the Communist Menace eventually became–well, some of them became–al-Qaeda, and, for obvious reasons, we stopped supporting and admiring them.
There’s no way we’re covering the whole nine year-long war in this one post, but we can talk about what led up to Moscow’s decision to invade its small southern neighbor and, in hindsight, set a whole lot of pretty bad shit in motion. I’m cheating a little bit here, because technically the invasion began on December 24, when the first Soviet troops started arriving in Kabul, or at least on December 25, when Russian forces crossed the border between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. But it was December 27 when those forces seized control of major government buildings across the capital and the war was really on. So I’m going with December 27.
Afghanistan sat right on top of the frontier in the “Great Game,” the Russian-British competition for control of Asia that lasted most of the 19th century, which meant that it was already in the Russian-Soviet orbit long before 1979. Both the Russian and British Empires came to an end in the 20th century, but Soviet interest in Afghanistan persisted. During the 1960s and 1970s, Moscow cultivated the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist movement opposed to Afghan King Mohammed Zahir Shah (d. 2007), and the Soviets were pretty pleased when the PDPA colluded with the country’s former prime minister (and Zahir Shah’s cousin), Mohammed Daoud Khan (d. 1978), to overthrow Zahir Shah and establish a republic in 1973. We should note, however–because we’ll be coming back to it–that in the late 1960s the PDPA began to splinter internally into several factions, the two largest of which were the Parcham, led by Babrak Karmal (d. 1996) and the Khalq, led by Nur Muhammad Taraki (d. 1979) and Hafizullah Amin (d. 1979). Khalq was the more radical of the two and pushed for a Soviet-style revolution, while Parcham supported a slower move toward socialism.
Mohammed Daoud Khan, now President Daoud if you please, was no Marxist. I don’t even think he was much of a socialist. He did his best to repress the PDPA and had a very touchy relationship with the Soviets, whom he accused (and probably with good reason) of meddling in Afghan politics by working to reconcile the factions within the PDPA. The Soviets, for their part, didn’t care for Daoud’s moves toward improving relations with the West and with the West’s allies in the Islamic world (i.e., Saudi Arabia and Egypt). But Daoud–not socialist enough for the socialists, too secular for religious types, and dictatorial as hell–wound up alienating pretty much everybody, including his own army, which had a growing Marxist orientation within its officer corps thanks to Soviet training. So you can see where this is heading.
A PDPA leader named Mir Akbar Khyber was killed on April 17, 1978, and Taraki immediately accused Daoud’s secret police of carrying out a hit, though interestingly some members of Parcham said that Khyber may have been killed by his Khalq rival, Amin. The actual assassin isn’t all that relevant. What is relevant is that a whole lot of Afghans believed Taraki and they began protesting. Daoud ordered a crackdown, but his position very quickly became untenable and he was executed by opposition fighters in the early morning hours of April 28. The PDPA now controlled Afghanistan, and Taraki was named president and prime minister with Amin serving as deputy PM. This event is known as the Saur Revolution, because it took place during the second month of the Iranian year, which in Dari (the Persian dialect spoken in much of Afghanistan) is Saur.
Taraki’s government took a few months to collect itself, then set about pissing off as many people as it could in as short a time as possible. It announced economic reforms that were incongruous with most people’s conception of Islamic law and were very out of step with Afghan tradition. It announced plans to protect women’s and minority rights. It changed the flag from the traditional Islamic color green to red. And it purged Parcham members from the party. In short, if you were an Islamist or a social conservative or a moderate socialist or a landowner, Taraki gave you reason to be angry. And people began to revolt en masse. The army, whose support had been essential to the PDPA takeover, said “uh, we didn’t sign on for this shit” and abandoned Taraki. Eventually, in September 1979, Amin abandoned Taraki too, and had the president executed.
All through this period, Soviet support for the PDPA government was pretty unwavering, but they could see the writing on the wall. When Amin’s attempt to salvage the situation by overthrowing Taraki failed, and it was clear that Amin was in over his head, Moscow prepared to intervene and began to station forces along the border in the Turkmen SSR. The primary justification for the intervention was the Brezhnev Doctrine, which obliged the Soviets to come to the aid of distressed Communist governments wherever they might be, but there were other reasons as well. For one thing, Washington had already started sending small arms to the Afghan rebels, and Moscow began to worry that the US might want to expand its influence in Afghanistan, so the situation took on a Cold War aspect. For another, the Soviets were as worried about the Islamic Revolution in Iran as anybody else, and they figured that, if they were going to have to confront a spreading revolutionary Islam, it would be better to do so in Afghanistan than within their own borders.
Moscow began moving troops into the country, assuring Amin that they were there for his benefit and protection. They struck, as I said above, on December 27, taking over government and media buildings in Kabul and seizing the presidential palace. Amin was executed, and the Soviets engineered the takeover of Babrak Kamal and the Parcham faction, figuring that this would be enough to pacify the rebels (“hey, it was all those Khalq idiots’ fault; things will be fine now”) and restore stability to the country. This thinking turned out to be…well, let’s say “misguided.” Instead, the Soviet invasion united a disparate opposition. Peasants and landowners, secular leftists and Islamists, Pashtuns and Tajiks and Uzbeks, all put aside their own problems with one another and adopted one overarching goal: to kick the Soviets out of the country. It took a bit over nine years, but–eventually–they did.
And we all lived happily ever after.