Conflict update: April 25 2017

SYRIA

This morning, Turkish aircraft struck Kurdish targets in Iraq’s Sinjar region and around the town of Derika (also known as Dayrik and al-Malikiyah) in northeastern Syria. The Syrian YPG militia says that 20 of its fighters were killed in the strikes, while Turkey claims that it killed 70 “militants” across both targets.

The Iraqi strike is a little more straightforward and I’ll mention that when we get to Iraq, but as far as Syria is concerned there’s no sense pretending that this is anything other than a Turkish attempt to undermine the fight against ISIS. Ankara claims that it struck a “terror hub,” whatever that means, in order to prevent weapons and other materiel from getting to the Kurdish PKK militant group in Turkey. But judging by the unambiguously hostile reception the strikes got from Washington it seems pretty clear that Turkey didn’t explore any other avenues for potentially interrupting the movement of arms or whatever from northeastern Syria to the PKK. They just skipped ahead to the airstrikes. I’m not saying that if Ankara had asked the US to intervene in whatever it claims the YPG/PKK were doing in northeastern Syria, that it would have worked out in Turkey’s favor. But going that route would have been worth the effort, assuming Turkey’s motives were really to interdict aid to the PKK. If talking doesn’t work you can always try airstrikes after that.

The YPG, as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, is of course America’s number one proxy in Syria and the centerpiece of plans to attack ISIS in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Turkey opposes those plans because it makes no distinction between the YPG and the PKK (there is a distinction, but it’s blurry to say the least) and doesn’t want to see the Syrian Kurds expanding their territory and potentially establishing an autonomous statelet in northern Syria. Turkey had proposed an alternative plan where by its forces in conjunction with elements of the Free Syrian Army would march on Raqqa from al-Bab and take the city without involving the Kurds, but the Turkish-FSA army didn’t do much to distinguish itself in al-Bab and, anyway, its path to Raqqa was closed off when the Syrian army drove ISIS out of the area south of al-Bab. At this point it’s likely that Turkey’s only recourse to stop the YPG from participating in the Raqqa operation is to start bombing the hell out of YPG positions further north, and that’s probably why it never asked for American help with this supposed PKK weapons problem. If Ankara had gone to the Americans and asked for help in preventing YPG weapons from allegedly being moved into Turkey, and the US had managed to convince the YPG to knock it off, then Turkey would’ve lost its excuse to bomb the YPG.

This is not going to be great for the US-Turkey relationship, and it’s going to get worse if the US decides to agree to YPG requests for a US-imposed no-fly zone over YPG-controlled territory. If the YPG wants to play hardball over this they kind of have the US over a barrel, because they could pull their forces out of the SDF, out of the Raqqa offensive, and Washington would be up the proverbial creek without a paddle. Factor in the possibility that the next one of these Turkish airstrikes might just kill a US servicemember or two, by accident presumably, and you’ve got a very combustible situation developing here.

Elsewhere in Syria, pro-government (i.e., Syrian or Russian) airstrikes killed at least 12 people and reportedly damaged a hospital in Idlib province today, at least 11 and perhaps more civilians were killed by US airstrikes in and around Tabqa, and the Syrian army is pouring resources into an effort to drive rebel forces out of Aleppo’s northern and western outskirts.

IRAQ

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Conflict update: April 24 2017

SYRIA

Bashar al-Assad’s next big target in Syria is retaking Idlib province, into which he and Moscow have cleverly funneled most of the northern rebel forces and a disturbing number of displaced civilians. The Century Foundation’s Sam Heller makes a reasonable suggestion as to what role the West should play when the Idlib fight begins in earnest:

Some have recently argued the United States and its allies should backstop Idlib’s rebels more or less indefinitely, both to defend civilians from the Assad regime and to maintain some non-extremist alternative. These proposals are untenable — unmoored from strategic logic and disconnected from the reality of Idlib’s rebellion, which is by now dominated by jihadists. The West should not sustain a jihadist-led section of the Syrian rebellion in perpetuity, to no obvious end and against a backdrop of ongoing, senseless civilian death. Instead, America and its Western allies ought to be ensuring that, when armed conflagration engulfs the northwest, civilians can get to safety.

As he’s killing civilians in Idlib, Assad will argue that they’re not really civilians–Idlib is controlled by jihadists, he’ll say, and these people are willingly living under their control. Ergo, they are irredeemable. But there are families who are in Idlib simply because that’s their home. There are other families who have migrated to Idlib to escape airstrikes elsewhere, to escape forced government conscription, or because that’s where Assad’s buses took them when they were forcibly evicted from places like Aleppo and Homs. The problem, as Heller points out, is that protecting their lives means giving them a way out of Idlib. And that means Western countries may have to pay Turkey to accept more refugees, or pay the Kurds controlling northwestern Syria to let more displaced Arabs into their enclave. We might have to do something to help real Syrians, whose desperation we find so compelling when we’re lobbing missiles in its general direction but whose actual well-being has never been a real consideration for us.

The US Treasury Department today slapped sanctions on 271 employees of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, who the US government says are intimately involved in Assad’s chemical weapons program.

IRAQ

An overnight ISIS ambush of a convoy in western Anbar province, near the town of Rutbah, killed ten off duty Iraqi soldiers. Rutbah, you may recall, was briefly seized and held by ISIS back in October.

There’s nothing particularly new to report from Mosul as far as I can tell. But there has been a rhetorical back-and-forth over the past few days between leaders of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that bears watching. In an interview with Al Jazeera last week, Erdoğan referred to the PMUs (using their Arabic name, al-Hashd al-Shaabi) as “a terrorist organization” and an agent of Iranian “expansion.” Over the weekend, a PMU spokesperson demanded to know “Who has given Erdogan the right to intervene in Iraq’s internal affairs?” and argued that Iran’s policy toward Iraq has been “transparent” in that Tehran has been trying to help Iraq fight off ISIS–this is a not-so-veiled allusion to the fact that Erdoğan and his government were believed to have at least tacitly colluded with ISIS back in, for example, 2014.

TURKEY

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Conflict update: April 22-23 2017

FRANCE

You may have heard that there was a little presidential election in France today. Well, after a lot of uncertainty and polling and analysis and more polling and oh man that one dude is coming on, what does that mean, this is so unpredictable…it looks like Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen will be facing off head-to-head in the runoff on May 7 (it looks like Macron will finish slightly ahead of her in the first round voting, but that doesn’t really matter). Just like the polls have shown pretty consistently since late January. That this outcome isn’t surprising is itself so surprising that I don’t really have much else to say about it. From a historical perspective this is a milestone vote in that it’s the first time that neither of the country’s major parties (the Republicans and the Socialists) will be represented in the runoff.

If you, like me, would really rather not see France follow America down the reactionary xenophobe path, then it’s obviously distressing to even see Le Pen advance to the second round. The fact that she’s gotten that far gives her movement something to build upon moving forward. But you should take solace in this handy Wikipedia graph of the polling for an until-now hypothetical Macron-Le Pen runoff:

opinion_polling_for_the_french_presidential_election2c_2017_macrone28093le_pen

Even if these polls are off–and the first round results suggest that the polling in this race has actually been pretty on point–they’d have to be monumentally off to make a Le Pen victory a possibility. Macron may be a centrist neoliberal squish but, unfortunately, he’s now easily the better option in this race.

IRAQ

ISIS fighters on Sunday attacked an Iraqi federal police base in the town of Hamam al-Alil, just south of Mosul, and killed at least three police officers. Iraqi police have been using that base as a staging area for their operations in west Mosul, which are as they have been for weeks still bogged down in the Old City. The stalemate there is as you might expect wreaking havoc on civilians–Iraqis who have managed to get out of the Old city describe eating boiled wheat grains and flour mixed with water because there’s simply nothing else left.

Though fighting in the Old City continues to be static Iraq’s counter-terrorism forces are continuing to advance through the center of west Mosul. But as Joel Wing writes, the civilian costs are continuing to mount:

There were more civilian casualties reported in Mosul. A car bomb went off in Zuhur in liberated east Mosul leaving 4 dead and 14 wounded. This was the first successful vehicle bomb in the east since February, and highlighted the fact that IS still has active cells in that half of the city. Air strikes in three pars of west Mosul left 17 fatalities and 30 injured. The Iraqi and Coalition forces have said they want to protect civilians, but the increase use of airpower and artillery along with the layout of east Mosul, and the use of human shields have all contributed to rising civilian deaths. That was the basis for a story by the Los Angeles Times that noted a huge spike in reported civilian casualties in the last few months based on data collected by Airwars.

ISIS, meanwhile, is reportedly executing Mosul residents who refuse to fight for the insurgent group, as well as residents who refuse to assist it in other ways.

SYRIA

An Israeli missile attack on a Syrian National Defense Forces (the umbrella agency for pro-government volunteer militias all over the country) in Quneitra province (near the occupied Golan Heights) killed three Syrian fighters on Sunday. The Israelis struck targets in Quneitra a couple of times this weekend in response to Syrian mortar fire hitting the Israeli-controlled parts of Golan late last week. Also over the weekend, pro-government forces with Russian help captured the town of Halfaya, north of Hama city, and at this point they’ve taken back all the territory the rebels were able to capture in Hama province a few weeks ago and are now advancing into areas that the rebels have held for several months at least.

The brief rebel success in Hama, it seems to me, points to the major problem Bashar al-Assad faces as the Syrian civil war settles into its new, post-Aleppo normal, which is that his army, depleted as it is from ~6 years of fighting, can’t be everywhere. The rebels can make temporary gains all over the place–they can’t hold them in the face of pro-Assad ground forces and Russian air power, but so what? The rebels aren’t trying to govern Syria–Assad is. The rebels aren’t trying to conquer Syria–Assad is. Now that the rebellion has really become a guerrilla affair (just ask Ayman al-Zawahiri, who apparently missed the sound of his own voice and decided to make a new audio recording advising Syria fighters to embrace guerrilla tactics), the rebels can settle in for a long haul while Assad has to try to win decisively. And if Assad’s army is in as ragged a shape as it appears to be from the outside, he’s going to have a hard time winning decisively.

I know people don’t like to hear this, but the study of civil wars since World War II says that they last, on average, about 10 years, and that the more factions are involved in the fighting, the longer they last. Which means Syria, with approximately 8.5 billion factions running around depending on the day, may very well not even be close to an end. Assad has been on a roll since Russia decided to get directly involved in the war, but that doesn’t mean he’s going to be able to win anytime soon.

Meanwhile, there were reports today of heavy fighting between ISIS and the Syrian Democratic Forces near Tabqa, and on Saturday between ISIS and, well, ISIS, in the town of Tabqa, as factions there argued over whether or not to surrender to the SDF. Tabqa, along with its dam and nearby airfield, has to be safely in SDF hands before they’ll be able to begin their assault on Raqqa. Raqqa remains the top US/SDF target in Syria, even though the Pentagon is saying that ISIS has moved most of its government functions to nearby Deir Ezzor.

YEMEN

A US drone strike in Shabwa province on Sunday reportedly killed three al-Qaeda fighters. Which doesn’t seem like that big a story, I have to admit. The truth is, there have been a lot of stories like this in recent days that I’ve ignored because, well, three AQAP assholes get blown up in a truck, who cares. But there have been a lot of stories like this. And the reason is that the one thing Donald Trump really seems to be embracing in his gig as President of the United States is that it gives him virtually unlimited privileges to bomb Yemen. He bombed it 70 times last month, as you may have heard. I don’t think this month’s number will be that high, but it wouldn’t surprise me if we’ve carried out a Yemen bombing per day this month, on average.

And for what? Three AQAP assholes getting blown up in a truck? The more explosives you drop on a place, the more times you risk something going horribly wrong–ask the survivors of that mosque we blew up in Syria last month about what “horribly wrong” means. While we’re busy tempting fate like this, we continue to enable Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen–an intervention that has killed thousands, is starving millions, and has had the effect of dramatically strengthening the same AQAP we’re trying to destroy, three-assholes-and-a-truck at a time.

LEBANON

The Lebanese army says it killed a local ISIS leader and arrested ten ISIS fighters in an operation in Arsal on Saturday.

ISRAEL-PALESTINE

While Gaza struggles to get by on six hours of electricity per day, the Israeli government is circling a deal with Cyprus, Greece, and Italy to support the construction of a pipeline that will send natural gas from Israel’s massive Leviathan offshore gas field (as well as from Cyprus’s offshore Aphrodite field) to Europe. Some people are apparently upset about this, arguing that it will “finance the Israeli occupation” and citing the multiple times the Israeli navy has attacked Palestinian fishermen who happen to stray into the waters above Israel’s two large offshore gas deposits. But, look, this gas ain’t gonna burn itself, you know what I mean? Who gives a shit about human rights, there’s a shitload of money to be made here!

On April 16, Palestinian leader and Israeli convict Marwan Barghouti wrote an op-ed for the New York Times explaining why he along with more than a thousand other Palestinians in Israeli prisons have undertaken a hunger strike to protest their treatment. Israeli media and the Israeli government did a masterful job of making the story about Barghouti’s criminal record rather than about the substance of his argument, and here’s James Zogby explaining why that’s so hard to swallow:

As one of the co-founders of the Palestine Human Rights Campaign, I have long been acquainted with Israel’s “justice system.” Since most Palestinians have been convicted based on confessions obtained under duress, international human rights organizations have condemned Israel’s violations of international law and the lack of due process afforded to prisoners. Over 80% of all arrested Palestinians have been refused the right to legal counsel until after they have been subjected to prolonged and often abusive interrogation. In his article, Barghouti describes these abuses that he and other prisoners have been forced to endure, noting that the equivalent of 40% of Palestine’s male population have been jailed by Israel.

The Israeli government’s response to the article and to the strike, itself, have been revealingly characteristic of their modus operandi.

Because the Times initially described Barghouti as a member of the Palestinian Parliament and a leader, Israel launched a campaign forcing the editors to change their description to note that Barghouti had been convicted of murder and membership in a terrorist organization.

What Israel did not mention was the fact that Barghouti’s arrest, trial, and conviction were denounced by the Swiss-based Inter-Parliamentary Union as being “a violation of international law” and having “failed to meet fair-trial standards.” The IPU concluded that “Barghouti’s guilt has not been established.”

IRAN

Conservative Iranian presidential candidate Mostafa Mir-Salim lit into President Hassan Rouhani today, claiming that the nuclear agreement Rouhani negotiated didn’t result in sanctions against Iran being lifted. This is demonstrably untrue, but it’s an easy claim to make when Iran’s unemployment rate is still high and the economic gains realized by the lifting of those sanctions haven’t (yet?) filtered down to middle and working class Iranians. This is the kind of attack Rouhani is going to get for the duration of the campaign, and refuting it is going to require him, at least somewhat, to ask Iranian voters to believe him over their lying eyes. That’s never an easy thing to do.

AFGHANISTAN

The death toll from Friday’s Taliban attack on an Afghan military base near the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, in Balkh province, has skyrocketed to at least 140 (that’s the official count so far–the Taliban are talking about 500 or more deaths). That takes the incident from the realm of “particularly deadly Taliban attack” to “worst Taliban attack since the war began in 2001,” which is quite a milestone here in 2017. People are calling for resignations, specifically of senior officers and civilian military bosses, though, to be fair, there were plenty of people in Afghanistan who were already calling for those things before this happened.

What makes this attack particularly troubling is not just the high casualty rate, not just the apparent ease with which the Taliban were able to get into a major Afghan military base, but the fact that the attack took place so close to the third-largest city in the country. The Taliban’s true strength has remained in rural areas–if they’re now able to carry out attacks on the outskirts of Mazar-i-Sharif, then that’s a pretty bad sign for the overall war effort.

NORTH KOREA

It was really a banner weekend for Pyongyang. At various points, the North Korean government: threatened to sink the USS Carl Vinson, threatened to nuke Australia, and arrested a US citizen as he tried to leave the country. Of these, the most serious is obviously the detention of Kim Sang-duk, a professor who becomes the third American known to be in North Korean custody. I say that because the first two things are obviously bluster whereas Kim is a real person who’s now really been arrested for, well, who knows what. Now factor in the possibility that Pyongyang will finally attempt its long-awaited nuclear test, and/or a new missile test, on Tuesday to mark the anniversary of the creation of its military, and we’re in for another fun week of World War III speculation.

SOMALIA

On Sunday, a roadside bomb in Puntland, courtesy of al-Shabab, killed six Somali soldiers and wounded another eight.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

BBC reporter Catherine Byaruhanga was somehow able to the DRC’s Kasai region to report on the Kamwina Nsapu rebellion that has killed hundreds of people since last August. The rebellion started when tribal leader Kamwina Nsapu was denied recognition by the Congolese government, but after he was killed by government forces the movement bearing his name seems to have become a catch-all for local grievances against Kinshasa:

The Kamuina Nsapu militia now has many factions all fighting for different reasons, but with the authorities their common target.

In Kananga, the biggest town in the region, we heard echoes of Paul’s testimony from different people.

One man, who did not want to be named, recalled an army raid:

“When the shooting began, my children ran and hid in a neighbour’s house.

“But the government soldiers got into that house – three people were killed and one of my children was injured.”

Another Kananga resident accused the armed forces of extortion:

“Soldiers are coming into neighbourhoods and harassing people for money. If you don’t have money, they threaten to kill you.”

“They are stealing mobile phones and money. People are scared and that’s why they are running away.”

UKRAINE

One American was killed and two other people were injured on Sunday when the vehicle they were in struck a mine in eastern Ukraine. The American was a paramedic working for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The incident has inspired calls, including from Washington, for Ukrainian separatists to allow the OSCE to conduct an investigation into exactly what happened.

UNITED KINGDOM

With France’s political future looking a bit less uncertain, we should probably look at early polling for the UK’s June snap elections, where there’s…really not much uncertainty at all. Prime Minister Theresa May’s Conservative Party is practically lapping the field in two polls released this weekend, taking 48 percent in one poll and 50 (!) percent in another.

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Conflict update: April 15-17 2017

Happy Easter again to everyone who celebrated, and Pesach Sameach to those observing Passover, which ends tomorrow. And if any Egyptians happen to be reading this, happy Sham el-Nisim.

TURKEY

The weekend’s biggest story was, as expected, Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan I’s formal coronation. By a slim margin, also as expected, Turkish voters on Sunday approved a referendum to amend Turkey’s constitution and change the country’s political system from a parliamentary one to a presidential one. The changes will be phased in over the next two years, but when the process is complete full executive authority will be concentrated in the office of president rather than split between the presidency and the prime minister’s office (with the PM, which is disappearing under the new system, actually the more powerful of the two positions). Erdoğan, who could now serve as president through 2029 under these changes, and will presumably try to change the constitution again in a decade if he wants to stay in office beyond that, will have vast new powers to control Turkey’s state bureaucracy, judiciary, military, and legislature.

Juan Cole writes at length about something I brought up on Friday, which is that many of these changes, on their face, are not particularly anti-democratic or authoritarian. On paper, when these changes are fully implemented Turkey’s government won’t look that much different from France’s, for example, or America’s–both of which have their own problems, don’t get me wrong, but neither of which could be called a dictatorship at least at the moment. The problem with Turkish democracy is, as it’s been at least since the Gezi Park protests in 2013, Erdoğan. Especially since last summer’s failed coup gave him an excuse to institute a permanent state of emergency, Erdoğan has been able to purge his political rivals, imprison his political opposition, stifle independent media, and rule Turkey as a one-man show for several years now under the current system, so all this change will do is make it easier for him to keep on keeping on.

Do these changes take Turkey back toward something resembling the Ottoman Empire? Stephen Cook says yes, but even he acknowledges that this is only really going to be the case when the president and parliament both come from the same party. The potential for an opposition parliament to check the president is there. The problem is that it’s impossible to see how an opposition parliament can ever be elected when Erdoğan has thoroughly stifled the Turkish press, has stocked the judiciary with his political appointees, has purged Turkish academia of anyone who dares to criticize him, and won’t let opposition parties mount anything approaching an actual political campaign (and likes to throw their leaders in jail just for good measure). And he didn’t need these amendments to do that. Does this result make Erdoğan a dictator? I would say no, but only because he pretty much already was one.

Also, while we’re mourning the demise of Turkish democracy, I think it’s important to bear in mind that it has always–and here I’m not just referring to the Erdoğan Era, but to the entire history of republican Turkey–had an authoritarian edge to it. You can go all the way back to the days of Atatürk and right through the decades during which another military coup seemed always to be just around the bend, and you’d be hard pressed to find a time when there wasn’t tension between the will of the Turkish people and the will of the few actors at the top of the Turkish political system.

So what happens now, as in right now, before 2019? Continue reading

Conflict update: April 10-14 2017

First off all, apologies for not doing one of these earlier this week. I had intended to crank something out on Wednesday but, well, when Wednesday rolled around I didn’t want to anymore.

Second, Easter and Passover greetings to my Christian and Jewish readers. This is one of the rare years when the Orthodox and Catholic Easter dates align with one another, so I don’t have to specify which Christians for a change. I’ll probably be back to regular programming on Monday, so I wanted to get an Easter message out just in case I don’t have the opportunity again before Sunday.

OK, so, strap in. I’ll try to make this as short as possible. Forgive me if some smaller stories fall through the cracks.

THE TRUMP DOCTRINE

If you assume that Rex Tillerson is actually able to speak on his boss’s behalf, then it’s possible that a “Trump Doctrine” is beginning to take shape:

Days after President Trump bombed Syria in response to a chemical attack that killed children, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said on Monday that the United States would punish those “who commit crimes against the innocents anywhere in the world.”

Hey, that’s interesting. So does that mean we’re going to punish the Saudis for committing crimes against the innocents in Yemen? No? Well, how about punishing Abdel Fattah el-Sisi the next time he disappears some political opponents or massacres a bunch of protesters? Not that either, huh? OK, well surely we’ll want to protect innocents in Bahrain from their–oh, I see. Are we at least planning to punish Bashar al-Assad for the myriad crimes he’s committed against innocents that haven’t involved nerve gas? Hah, not even that, cool.

Hey, what about those ~270 or so innocents we bombed in Mosul about a month ago? Or the ~50 or so we bombed at evening prayer in al-Jinah around that same time? Are we going to punish ourselves for those crimes?

No, don’t answer, I already know. This is quite a doctrine we’re developing. We’ll punish those who commit crimes against the innocents anywhere in the world (offer may not be valid in your area).

SYRIA

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What’s the use

The UN Security Council met today in special session today to discuss yesterday’s chemical weapons incident in the Syrian town of Khan Shaykhun, the death toll from which is now up to at least 72. Nothing came of it, because the UN Security Council is set up, pretty much by design, to do nothing on any matter of controversy.

First of all, here’s what the media is reporting about what happened in Syria yesterday. I almost said “here’s what we know about what happened,” but then we don’t actually know what happened, we only really know what the press is reporting to us.

  • First of all, questions about cause aside, all the evidence collected from the scene that I’ve read about is consistent with the idea that the victims were exposed to a nerve agent. That includes the way the gas behaved (chlorine gas, for example, dissipates much more quickly than this stuff did) and the symptoms observed by medical personnel. Sarin seems to be the likeliest possibility, but it certainly could have been something else, or sarin in combination with something else.
  • Second, we know that somebody affiliated with the Syrian government and possessing an air force in Syria, either the government itself or Russia, bombed Khan Shaykhun yesterday. Nobody denies this. Hell, they reportedly did it again today.

That’s the stuff that seems fairly certain. Now we get into the question of causation, which is of course being disputed.  Continue reading

Conflict update: April 4 2017

SYRIA

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 58 people (one estimate puts the toll over 100) were killed today in what certainly seems to have been a chemical weapons attack on the town of the town of Khan Shaykhun in Idlib province. Doctors treating the victims described people suffocating, vomiting, foaming at the mouth–all symptoms consistent with some kind of chemical agent. The strikes also reportedly targeted the town’s Syrian Civil Defense office, and, later on, a clinic where some of the victims of the initial attack had been taken for treatment.

khan shaykhun

Khan Shaykhun (Google Maps)

There’s been an immediate consensus among Western governments and media outlets that the Syrian government deliberately used chemical weapons again, and the UN Security Council is scheduled to meet tomorrow to discuss the incident. And that’s most likely what happened. But some pro-government media outlets have been reporting that what actually happened was that government airstrikes hit a rebel weapons depot that contained chemical weapons, and that the explosions distributed the gas into the air and thus on to the victims. In the interest of being completely fair, this scenario is not entirely outside the realm of possibility–al-Qaeda, at least, probably does have some chemical weapons taken from government caches, including sarin (which, based especially on the “foaming at the mouth” description, seems like it may have been the gas in question here), and al-Qaeda–or whatever it’s calling itself this week–is active in Idlib and, as far as I know, specifically in the area around Khan Shaykhun. But if you were going to presume a cause here, then intentional government use is certainly the more likely one.

President Trump is, unsurprisingly, blaming Barack Obama for this apparent CW attack, reasoning that Obama should have taken Assad out after the Ghouta chemical weapons attack in 2013. This is an…interesting link for Trump to push, because…wait for it:

Also too, the administration isn’t actually going to do anything about this attack, despite the pressure they’re getting from Congress, because there’s nothing for them to do. They can’t attack Assad because he’s under Russian protection. They can’t start sending heavy weapons to the Free Syrian Army without seriously risking those weapons becoming al-Qaeda property. They can’t ram a sternly worded resolution through the UN Security Council, because Russia will veto it. They probably can’t even order Assad to destroy all his chemical weapons but for reals this time, because Assad’s probably not going to admit to having any chemical weapons anymore despite this new evidence to the contrary. One small thing Trump could do is to stop periodically kissing Assad’s ass in public, but he’s likely too undisciplined/addled to even manage that.

Elsewhere, Reuters reported today on the risks people are taking to try to escape Raqqa before the expected US-coordinated assault comes. ISIS is trying to keep people in the city to act as human shields, so escaping is a dicey proposition.

RUSSIA

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